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EXTENDING THE REACH OF THE CHINESE  
LABOR LAW: HOW DOES THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S 
COURT’S 2006 INTERPRETATION TRANSFORM  
LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION? 
Jill E. Monnin† 
Abstract: Chinese workers are taking advantage of the dispute resolution tools 
that legal reform has provided in the past decade, including mediation, arbitration, and 
litigation.  Despite a history of resolving disputes through informal mediation, more and 
more workers are relying on the new pathways of arbitration and civil suits in local 
courts.  The 1993 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes and the 
1994 Labor Law facilitated workers’ access to formal legal forums.  Then, in 2006, a 
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) interpretation made a number of important changes to 
the application of the Labor Law and workers’ access to dispute resolution. 
The SPC interpretation of the Labor Law expands access to labor dispute resolution 
by providing a clear standard for determining when labor disputes arise, requiring courts 
to accept appeals of arbitral decisions involving specific claims, allowing the suspension 
of the arbitration application period, and permitting certain claims to bypass mandatory 
arbitration.  This Comment argues that the SPC interpretation successfully responds to 
criticisms of dispute resolution under the Labor Law and will help to ensure that law 
continues to operate as a tool for China’s workers and government.  The SPC is likely to 
continue filling gaps in the law and respond with needed changes in the absence of clear 
legislative rules.  Only the future will tell whether the potential impact of the 2006 
interpretation becomes a reality. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
China’s dramatic economic development since the country’s “opening 
up” in the 1980s brought about important legal changes.  As national and 
international companies turn to China’s abundant and cheap labor force to 
produce and manufacture an entire range of goods, Chinese labor law is 
undergoing a dynamic rebirth and development.  The 1994 Labor Law 
(“Labor Law”),1 based on provisions of the 1993 Regulations on the 
Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (“Labor Regulations”),2 is the 
foundation for labor rights and relationships in China.  Beyond coverage of 
wages, healthcare, insurance, and working hours, the Labor Law also 
                                           
†
 The author wishes to thank Professor Veronica Taylor and the editors and staff of the Pacific Rim 
Law and Policy Journal for their guidance and encouragement.  She would also like to thank her parents 
and friends for their patience and support throughout the writing process. 
1
 Labor Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, effective 
Jan. 1, 1995), translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, 16 (P.R.C.). 
2
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (promulgated by the State Council, 
July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993), translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, 76 (P.R.C.).  
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provides for labor dispute resolution.3  This resolution process is at the 
center of an important shift in Chinese dispute resolution away from forms 
of mediation towards more adversarial arbitration and litigation offered 
under the Labor Law.4  The past decade witnessed remarkable increases in 
the use of formal arbitration and litigation for labor disputes.5  Workers are 
bringing their grievances through the formal resolution process in greater 
numbers every year with important implications for China’s labor policy. 
Impressive statistics illustrate the shift towards formal labor dispute 
resolution and highlight the potential that workers see in resolving disputes.6  
Yet there are a number of weaknesses in the formal system, including lack of 
finality in judgments, difficulties with enforcement of arbitral awards, and 
ambiguities in the Labor Law’s provisions.  Increases in the number of 
appeals made from labor arbitration to local courts,7 along with attempts to 
reformulate labor claims as traditional civil claims,8 seem to be symptoms of 
these weaknesses. 
An Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) on Several 
Issues Concerning Application of Laws in the Trial of Labor Disputes 
(“Interpretation”)9 is a recent attempt to clarify the labor dispute resolution 
provisions of the Labor Law.  While the impact of the SPC’s Interpretation 
has yet to be seen, it successfully addresses a number of concerns with the 
efficacy of the formal resolution process. 
An analysis of the effects of the Interpretation on labor dispute 
resolution can help to not only understand how the process may change in 
the future, but also to appreciate the SPC’s increasing role in Chinese legal 
reforms.  For workers and employers who use the process, practitioners who 
represent them, and others who monitor the many legal and political changes 
underway in China, a close look at the Interpretation will deepen 
understanding of the country’s developing labor laws. 
                                           
3
 See Labor Law art. 77. 
4
 See Fu Hualing & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication: Settling Labor Disputes in 
China, CHINA RIGHTS FORUM, Sept. 2004, at 18, 20. 
5
 See id.; see also Mary E. Gallagher, “Use the Law as Your Weapon!”: Institutional Change and 
Legal Mobilization in China, in ENGAGING THE LAW IN CHINA: STATE, SOCIETY, AND POSSIBILITIES FOR 
JUSTICE 54, 67-70 (Neil J. Diamant, et al. eds., 2005). 
6
 See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 70 fig.3.5 (showing an increase in the percentage of labor disputes 
resolved by arbitration from just under thirty percent in 1996 to almost fifty percent in 2001). 
7
 See id. at 73. 
8
 See Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 21. 
9
 Interpretation on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Law in the Trial of Labour 
Disputes (II) (promulgated by the Supreme People’s Court, Aug. 14, 2006, effective Oct. 1, 2006), 
translated in CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 2006, 1 (P.R.C.) [hereinafter 2006 Interpretation]. 
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This Comment examines the provisions of the Interpretation, its 
relationship to criticisms of labor dispute resolution, and its implications for 
the SPC’s role in influencing labor policy in a socialist market economy.  It 
argues that the Interpretation successfully responds to a number of concerns 
with labor dispute resolution and is likely to increase the number and 
effectiveness of labor disputes.  Part II provides background and context for 
the increasing use of labor dispute resolution in China and the SPC’s 
traditionally limited role in legal interpretation.  Part III introduces the 
contours of the recent Interpretation and analyzes the ways in which it 
successfully responds to criticisms of Chinese labor dispute resolution.  Part 
IV then argues that the SPC’s approach to labor disputes exemplifies the 
growing role of the court in interpreting law to fill legislative gaps.  Though 
the SPC is an organ of the Communist government, the Interpretation is 
evidence that the SPC is expanding its interpretive role, much like courts in 
other parts of the world. 
II. THE INTERPRETATION CONTINUES THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND 
USE OF THE LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESS 
Recent economic development in China and the formulation of the 
Labor Law provide context to understand the implications of the SPC 
Interpretation.  Laws and regulations now define Chinese labor dispute 
resolution, creating a process that continues to draw attention as more and 
more workers rely on the law. 
A. The Creation of Formal Labor Dispute Resolution Was a Response to 
the Negative Consequences of China’s Shift to a Socialist Market 
Economy 
China’s economic transformation fundamentally altered the country’s 
traditional labor system.  Prior to 1978, Chinese workers depended on the 
“iron rice bowl,” the term used to describe the lifetime job security available 
to those who worked within state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”).10  Starting in 
1978, economic reforms in China required the country to remove the 
traditional state allocation of jobs, introduce labor contracts, and give greater 
attention to domestic labor conditions and relationships.11  These reforms 
required the development of legislation as part of Deng Xiaoping’s “Two-
                                           
10
 VIRGINIA HARPER HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR RIGHTS 
AND LEGAL REFORM 11 (2003); see also Gallagher, supra note 5, at 60-61. 
11
 See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 56.  
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Hands” policy:  developing the economy while also strengthening the legal 
system.12 
In 1986, the system of permanent employment through formal job 
assignments was replaced with a labor contract system.13  Leaders believed 
that the new system would create choice and initiative in the labor market, 
leading to increased productivity.14  The introduction of labor contracts 
would eventually provide workers with articulated rights and obligations to 
assert against employers within the formal resolution system.15  They also 
served dual interests by “enhancing labor efficiency and flexibility, while 
also protecting workers’ rights and interests.”16 
A pivotal change came in 1992 when the Fourteenth Party Congress 
introduced the concept of a “socialist market economy.”17  This new concept 
encompassed a shift away from central planning and a move towards the 
free action of enterprises within the market.18  An amendment to the 
Constitution illustrated the importance of this new concept to China’s 
continuing development.19  Article 15 was amended in 1993 to make explicit 
that “[t]he state has put into practice a socialist market economy.”20 
With the pursuit of the new socialist market economy, a variety of 
labor issues arose, including unemployment, dangerous working conditions, 
and difficulty accessing benefits and asserting rights.21  As part of reform, 
state employment was reduced and large SOEs were sold into the private 
sector, resulting in high unemployment.22  Millions of migrant workers 
inundated coastal regions and cities, creating a “buyer’s market for labor” 
and giving employers an opportunity to take advantage of abundant work 
forces.23  With these various issues and the tensions they created within the 
population, “[i]t is perhaps little wonder then that the state has made labor 
                                           
12
 Jianfu Chen, Market Economy and the Internationalisation of Civil and Commercial Law in the 
People’s Republic of China, in LAW, CAPITALISM AND POWER IN ASIA 69, 70 (Kanishka Jayasuriya ed., 
1999). 
13
 HO, supra note 10, at 10 n.2. 
14
 MARVIN J. LEVINE, WORKER RIGHTS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN ASIA’S FOUR NEW TIGERS: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 79 (1997). 
15
 See HO, supra note 10, at 19, 21. 
16
 Gallagher, supra note 5, at 62. 
17
 LEVINE, supra note 14, at 6. 
18
 See HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOR LAW IN CHINA 12-13 (2d ed. 2003). 
19
 See id. at 42. 
20
 Constitution (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982), art. 15, translated at 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (P.R.C.). 
21
 See HO, supra note 10, at 1-2; LEVINE, supra note 14, at 31. 
22
 HO, supra note 10, at 12. 
23
 LEVINE, supra note 14, at 7. 
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dispute resolution a priority and that labor issues have become so central to 
domestic policy makers.”24 
The government responded by providing formal procedures.  The 
1993 Labor Regulations were implemented to create an administrative 
procedure for handling labor disputes.25  The 1993 Labor Regulations 
replaced the 1987 Provisional Regulations on the Handling of Enterprise 
Labor Disputes in State Enterprises (“Provisional Regulations”),26 which 
only applied to contract disputes and the termination of permanent SOE 
employees.27  While the earlier Provisional Regulations introduced a three-
step resolution process, the Labor Regulations expanded the scope of 
covered labor disputes.28  The Labor Law codified the Labor Regulations 
and improved upon the Provisional Regulations. 
B. The Labor Regulations and Labor Law Provide the Current 
Framework for a Three-Step Labor Dispute Resolution Process 
Chinese labor dispute resolution is now a three-step process outlined 
in the Labor Regulations and the Labor Law.29  These three steps include 
optional mediation, arbitration, and adjudication.30  To begin the resolution 
process, workers and employers may apply to the dispute mediation 
committee within their enterprise, if one is established, or may apply directly 
to a labor dispute arbitration committee to pursue arbitration.31  According to 
Article 78 of the Labor Law, a dispute can only come before the people’s 
courts if one of the parties does not accept the arbitral award.32  Therefore, 
arbitration necessarily precedes litigation. 
The Labor Regulations and Labor Law suggest mediation as the initial 
step towards resolving a labor dispute.33  Under the Labor Regulations, one 
principle that labor dispute resolution “shall observe” is an emphasis on 
                                           
24
 HO, supra note 10, at 35. 
25
 Mao-Chang Li, Legal Aspects of Labor Relations in China: Critical Issues for International 
Investors, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 552 (1995). 
26
 See HO, supra note 10, at 38. 
27
 JOSEPHS, supra note 18, at 87. 
28
 See id. 
29
 See Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (promulgated by the State 
Council, July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993), art. 6, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, 
at 76, 77 (P.R.C.); Labor Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, 
effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 77, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 16, 28 (P.R.C.). 
30
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 6; Labor Law art. 77. 
31
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 6; Labor Law art. 79. 
32
 Labor Law art. 78. 
33
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 6; Labor Law art. 77. 
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mediation.34  This standard and its appearance in the Labor Law reflect 
traditional cultural preferences arising from Confucian and Maoist 
principles, as well as a historically underdeveloped court system.35  The 
mediation committee is located within an enterprise and is comprised of 
representatives of the workers, employer, and trade union.36  The All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions is affiliated with the Communist Party and 
independent unions are prohibited.37  A representative of the trade union 
serves as Chair of the committee.38  The language of the Labor Law does not 
make an agreement reached with the help of the committee legally binding, 
but any agreement reached “shall be implemented by the parties involved.”39 
Arbitration is either an initial step to resolve a labor dispute or the 
next step if mediation fails.40  Arbitration takes place before a panel of 
representatives from the local labor administrative department, trade union, 
and employer,41 who make a final ruling and determine an arbitral award.42  
A written application for arbitration must be made within sixty days from the 
date the dispute arises.43  This rather short statute of limitations under the 
Labor Law overrides the six-month period under the Labor Regulations.44 
Under Article 83 of the Labor Law, adjudication is a last resort for 
labor disputes.45  Appeals from an arbitral award can be made to a civil court 
within fifteen days after the award is received.46  Mediation is encouraged 
throughout the dispute resolution process, even if a dispute reaches the 
courts.47  While this is not required under the language of the Labor Law, the 
Labor Regulations and Article 9 of the Civil Procedure Law both emphasize 
                                           
34
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 4; see also JAMES M. 
ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK: A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 395, 397 (2d 
ed. 2005) (observing that the arbitral tribunal must attempt mediation during the hearing). 
35
 See Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., “Court-Performed” Mediation in the People’s Republic of China: A 
Proposed Model to Improve the United States Federal District Courts’ Mediation Programs, 15 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 391, 394-99 (2000). 
36
 Labor Law art. 80. 
37
 Hilary K. Josephs, Labor Law in a “Socialist Market Economy”: The Case of China, 33 COLUM. 
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 559, 571-72 (1995). 
38
 Labor Law art. 80. 
39
 Id. 
40
 Id. art. 79. 
41
 Id. art. 81. 
42
 Id. art. 83 
43
 Id. art. 82. 
44
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes (promulgated by the State Council, 
July 6, 1993, effective Aug. 1, 1993), art. 23, translated in CHINESE L. & GOV’T, Nov.–Dec. 2002, at 76, 80 
(P.R.C.). 
45
 Labor Law art. 83. 
46
 Id. 
47
 ZIMMERMAN, supra note 34, at 397. 
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mediation by encouraging courts to pursue conciliation with the consent of 
the parties.48 
Since its inception, many Chinese workers and employers have turned 
to this three-step resolution process.49  Recent trends demonstrate that they 
are relying on the process in greater numbers every year.50 
C. Statistics Illustrate a Dramatic Increase in the Use of Arbitration and 
Adjudication Since the 1990s 
Considering the traditional preference for mediation of disputes, 
statistics of formal labor dispute resolution are surprising.  Community 
resolution of disputes has a long tradition in China’s cultural and political 
development,51 illustrated by a two thousand year old Confucian proverb, “it 
is better to die of starvation than to become a thief; it is better to be vexed to 
death than to bring a lawsuit.”52  In imperial China, mediation was often 
favored because of the “inaccessible and inadequate court system,” which 
required traveling long distances to the nearest courts to face corrupt and 
intimidating magistrates.53  When the People’s Republic of China was 
founded in 1949 and previous legal systems were rejected, mediation 
persisted and was codified in the 1954 Provisional General Rules for the 
Organization of People’s Mediation Committees.54  Throughout Mao’s 
leadership and the rise of Communism, mediation represented the belief that 
individual interests must give way to community and harmony.55  As one 
scholar said, “[I]nformal mediation played a strong ideological role, serving 
to mobilize the masses through grassroots organizations.”56  Therefore, 
mediation became a tool for the government to control the avenues available 
for dispute resolution. 
                                           
48
 Regulations on the Resolution of Enterprise Labor Disputes art. 4; Civil Procedure Law 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991), art. 9, 
translated at CHINACOURT.ORG, http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2694 (last visited Mar. 8, 
2007) (P.R.C.). 
49
 See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 54. 
50
 See id.; see also Labour disputes and wilderness cases more common in courtroom, CHINADAILY, 
Mar. 11, 2002, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-03/11/content_110270.htm (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2007). 
51
 See Colatrella, supra note 35, at 395-96. 
52
 Jun Ge, Mediation, Arbitration and Litigation: Dispute Resolution in the People’s Republic of 
China, 15 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 122, 133 (1996) (citing Jerome Alan Cohen, Chinese Mediation on the 
Eve of Modernization, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1201 (1966)). 
53
 Colatrella, supra note 35, at 397. 
54
 See Jun Ge, supra note 52, at 123. 
55
 See Colatrella, supra note 35, at 398. 
56
 Margaret Y.K. Woo, Law and Discretion in the Contemporary Chinese Courts, 8 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y J. 581, 596 (1999). 
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Statistics illustrate an important shift away from mediation to 
arbitration for labor disputes.  From 1996 to 2001, there was a marked 
increase in the use of arbitration with a parallel decrease in the use of 
mediation.57  During that period, the number of cases accepted for mediation 
fell from 118,732 to 6,374.58  In contrast, the number of cases accepted for 
arbitration grew from 47,951 to 184,116 in 2002.59  It is important to note 
that any statistics related to the formal dispute resolution process reflect 
those cases that actually reach formal forums.  This data is only a portion of 
the labor disputes that actually arise.  However, the increase in the number 
of cases arbitrated each year does suggest that workers and their employers 
are using arbitration to reach a resolution. 
Along with increases in arbitration, statistics also show a marked 
increase in adjudication.60  From 1995 to 2001, the number of labor disputes 
adjudicated in Chinese courts each year increased from 28,285 to 100,923 
cases.61  In 2005, parties filed over 300,000 labor lawsuits.62  That number is 
a 20.5% increase from 2004.63  The overall increase in labor disputes relates 
to “[i]ncreasing urbanization, the restructuring of state enterprises, and the 
new wave of foreign direct investment into China since 1992.”64  The 2006 
Interpretation comes at a time when use of labor dispute resolution is at its 
peak after over a decade of development. 
D. During Early Economic and Legal Reforms, the Ability of the SPC to 
Help Implement the Labor Law Was Formally Constrained 
When workers first began to use the formal labor dispute process, the 
SPC did not act to interpret or aid its implementation.  Formally, the SPC is 
limited in its duties.  Conflicting provisions of the Constitution govern the 
powers of the SPC.  While the Constitution provides that the “people’s 
courts shall, in accordance with the law, exercise judicial power 
independently and are not subject to interference by administrative organs, 
public organizations or individuals,”65 the preamble suggests otherwise.66  In 
                                           
57
 See Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 18; see also Gallagher, supra note 5, at 54, 67-70. 
58
 Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 18. 
59
 See id. 
60
 Gallagher, supra note 5, at 72-73. 
61
 Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 20. 
62
 He Huifeng, 300,000 Labour Row Cases Filed Last Year, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST (Hong 
Kong), May 12, 2006, at 10. 
63
 Id. 
64
 Mao-Chang Li, supra note 25, at 523. 
65
 Constitution (adopted by the Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 4, 1982) art. 126, translated at 
http://english.people.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2007) (P.R.C.). 
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its preamble, the Constitution requires that legal decisions be based on four 
principles:  1) “the leadership of the Communist Party,” 2) “the guidance of 
Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought,” 3) “the people’s democratic 
dictatorship,” and 4) “the socialist road.”67  These are the four cardinal 
principles espoused by Deng Xiaoping.68  Political influence and policy, 
then, is made an integral part of judicial decision-making in China.  In fact, 
“[n]ot only is the substance of law determined by Party policy, but the 
interpretation and application of law remains subject to changes in Party 
policy.”69  Because the SPC helps to interpret the law,70 its interpretations are 
subject to political influences and policies.71 
The functions of the SPC include interpretation, adjudication, 
legislation, and general administration of the judiciary.72  Interpretation was 
traditionally limited because the Constitution only authorized the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress to interpret national laws.73  
However, the 1981 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress Providing an Improved Interpretation of the Law 
(“Interpretation Resolution”) extended interpretive powers to other state 
organs, including the SPC.74  The Interpretation Resolution, which was not 
superceded by the 1982 Constitution, authorized the SPC to interpret 
“questions involving the specific application of laws and decrees in court 
trials,” meaning adjudication work.75  While the Interpretation Resolution 
gave the SPC increased competencies, those new powers were still limited. 
With the increasing use of labor arbitration and litigation, weaknesses 
in the dispute resolution process became apparent, encouraging the SPC to 
act by promulgating the 2006 Interpretation. 
                                                                                                                              
66
 Susan Finder, The Supreme People’s Court of the People’s Republic of China, 7 J. CHINESE L. 
145, 148 (1993). 
67
 See Woo, supra note 56, at 592 (quoting the preamble of the Constitution). 
68
 STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 126 (1999). 
69
 Woo, supra note 56, at 592. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. 
72
 Finder, supra note 66, at 164. 
73
 Id. 
74
 Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress Providing an Improved 
Interpretation of the Law (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 10, 1981, 
effective June 10, 1981), translated at http://www.novexcn.com/interp_of_law.html (last visited Mar. 8, 
2007) (P.R.C.). 
75
 Finder, supra note 66, at 164-65. 
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III. THE INTERPRETATION SUCCESSFULLY ADDRESSES DIFFICULTIES WITH 
LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The provisions of the Interpretation make a number of positive 
changes to labor dispute resolution that benefit workers.  As the next section 
argues, increases in litigation and attempts by workers to litigate rather than 
to go through mandatory arbitration illustrate weaknesses in the process.  
The formal labor dispute process has been criticized for lacking finality, 
raising issues with compliance, and failing to provide truly non-partisan 
forums in practice.76  The Interpretation makes four important changes.  The 
SPC addresses these weakness and provides more opportunities for workers 
to bring their disputes through the formal process by clarifying how to 
determine the date when a labor dispute arose, allowing certain types of 
disputes to go straight to civil court, requiring courts to accept appeals and 
applications for enforcement in specific cases, and allowing tolling of the 
application period in certain circumstances. 
A. The Interpretation Requires Acceptance of Appeals for Specific 
Claims, Helping to Improve Enforcement of Arbitral Awards 
Arbitration procedures raise concerns about enforcement.  While 
arbitral awards are binding, the increasing number of appeals by workers 
suggests that employers are not following through on their legal 
obligations.77  The Interpretation does not directly address the lack of finality 
in the dispute resolution process, but indirectly provides for final judgment 
by requiring courts to accept certain types of appeals and enforcement 
applications. 
1. The Rising Number of Appeals to Civil Courts Reveals Difficulties 
with Enforcing Arbitral Awards 
Although the Labor Law and the Labor Regulations intend litigation 
to be a last resort for disputes, the statistics cited above show that labor 
adjudication is marked by dramatic increases.  The process has been 
described as “one hearing and two appeals.”78  While only 1.7% of arbitral 
decisions were appealed in 1995, nearly seventy percent were appealed in 
                                           
76
 See Gallagher, supra note 5, 73-74; see also HO, supra note 10, at 172-73 (discussing difficulties 
with enforcement); and Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 19-21 (discussing difficulties with finality and 
bias forums). 
77
 See Gallagher, supra note 5, at 73-4. 
78
 Id. (quoting a private interview with a lawyer in Beijing) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Beijing and Shanghai in 2003.79  A plausible explanation for this increase is 
that arbitration panels are not providing final, legally-binding judgments in a 
given dispute.  The high number of appeals suggests two possibilities for 
why this might be the case:  either those who are unhappy with arbitral 
awards are appealing, or disputants are having difficulty enforcing arbitral 
awards and are hoping that the courts will ensure compliance. 
Given that most arbitration decisions are made in favor of workers 
rather than their employers,80 it seems more likely that the increase in 
appeals reflects attempts to enforce arbitral judgments against employers.  
Workers bring almost ninety percent of all labor disputes.81  Statistics for 
major Chinese provinces illustrate that workers often win labor disputes.  In 
Shangdong, Guangdong, and Heilongjiang Provinces, workers respectively 
won 62.46%, 55.88%, and 55.32% of labor disputes arbitrated from 1995 to 
2001.82  These regions represent a majority of labor disputes, since they are 
coastal regions where migrant labor is concentrated.83  For example, one-
third of Chinese labor disputes were in Guangdong Province at the end of 
the 1990s.84  In addition, a 1998 Ministry of Labor report found that fifty-six 
percent of disputes initiated by workers came out in their favor while only 
sixteen percent of cases were decided in favor of employers.85  The 
remaining disputes were mediated, withdrawn, or went to the people’s 
courts.86  The increase in appeals poses “an interesting and possibly 
disturbing development”87 because workers may have difficulty enforcing 
the arbitral awards against employers.88  Employers appeal only about five 
percent of arbitral decisions,89 suggesting appeals have “more to do with 
enforcement of the decision than with its outcome.”90  Therefore, it appears 
that workers have to rely on the courts to force compliance in the face of 
resistance by employers. 
                                           
79
 Id. 
80
 See, e.g. HO, supra note 10, at 168. 
81
 Id. at 152. 
82
 Hualing & Choy, supra note 4, at 21. 
83
 Id. at 18. 
84
 Id. 
85
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2. The Interpretation Indirectly Provides for Enforcement by Requiring 
Acceptance of Appeals in Specific Instances 
The Interpretation requires courts to accept appeals from arbitration 
panels for certain types of labor disputes.91  According to the language of the 
Labor Law, parties “can raise a lawsuit” if they object to the arbitral ruling, 
but there is no language in the Labor Law requiring the people’s courts to 
accept these appeals.92  Under the Interpretation, civil courts must accept an 
appeal from arbitration if the conflict concerns whether the employment 
relationship was cancelled or terminated, or whether compensation should 
be paid for cancellation or termination.93  A court must also accept an appeal 
in a case involving a request by the worker after the relationship is cancelled 
or terminated for money or collateral paid for her employment contract.94  In 
a case over treatment of a work-related injury or an occupational disease, a 
court must also accept an appeal from arbitration.95  Finally, a court must 
accept an appeal in a dispute over advanced payment of wages or medical 
expenses, or if the employer fails to make the payments following an 
arbitration ruling.96 
Requiring courts to accept appeals in these four types of labor 
disputes expands the jurisdiction of the people’s courts over labor disputes 
and will likely lead to increased labor litigation in the future.  The 
Interpretation allows workers to more easily appeal unfavorable arbitral 
awards and will aid enforcement by ensuring that more appeals are actually 
accepted.  While the Interpretation does not directly address the 
noncompliance of employers with arbitration awards, clear identification of 
disputes that will be accepted if appealed may make employers more likely 
to cooperate in order to avoid litigation. 
B. The Interpretation Defines and Allows for Suspension of the 
Arbitration Application Period, Addressing Prior Difficulties in 
Determining When Disputes Arise 
The rising number of appeals also illustrates that workers are 
challenging rejections by arbitral panels based on the application period.  
How to determine when the application period begins was never clear, so 
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arbitral panels were able to reject late applications.  The Interpretation 
provides two solutions that will aid workers. 
1. The Increasing Number of Appeals Reveals Difficulties with the 
Application Period for Arbitration 
The increase in appeals of arbitral decisions may relate to the Labor 
Law’s application period for labor disputes.  As mentioned above, the Labor 
Law requires that applications be made to arbitration within sixty days after 
the dispute arises.97  Workers are not always aware of this time limit and will 
often approach the employer to negotiate a resolution before considering 
arbitration.98  Yet, by approaching an employer, a worker may use up part or 
all of the sixty-day statute of limitations.99  In its 2001 Interpretations 
Concerning Several Issues Regarding the Application of Law to the Trial of 
Labor Dispute Cases (“2001 Interpretation”), the SPC allows workers to 
appeal to civil court when an arbitration panel rejects an application based 
on the expiration of the application period.100  Therefore, the increase in 
appeals may also result from workers taking advantage of this opportunity to 
have a court review the arbitration committee’s decision to reject an 
application.  However, the problem of determining when the period begins 
was not addressed by the 2001 Interpretation. 
2. The 2006 Interpretation Defines When the Application Period Begins, 
Increasing the Likelihood that Arbitration Applications Will Be 
Accepted 
The 2006 SPC Interpretation defines how to determine when a labor 
dispute arises for purposes of calculating the arbitration application 
period,101 perhaps “one of the most contentious issues in [China’s] 
employment law.”102  In a wage payment dispute during an ongoing 
employment relationship, the dispute arises when the employer sends a 
written notice of its refusal to pay.103  If there is no such notice, the dispute 
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arises on the date the worker asserts her rights.104  For problems concerning 
cancellation or termination of an employment relationship where the 
employer cannot prove that the worker received a written notice, the dispute 
arises on the date the worker asserts her rights.105  Finally, for a dispute over 
payment of wages, severance, or benefits after the labor relationship is 
cancelled or terminated, the dispute arises either on the date the employer 
undertook to make payment or on the date the relationship was cancelled or 
terminated.106 
This portion of the 2006 Interpretation is beneficial to workers for two 
reasons.  First, the SPC places the burden of proof on the employer to show 
that written notice was given.107  Second, it makes the filing date of an 
application more favorable to workers by calculating the application period 
from the date the worker asserts her rights.108  There may be future 
complications when determining what constitutes the assertion of one’s 
rights, such as whether it is the worker’s initial attempt to approach the 
employer, or other actions taken by the worker.  Nonetheless, these 
provisions hold promise for workers whose disputes would have been 
rejected prior to the 2006 Interpretation based on the application period. 
The 2006 Interpretation also allows suspension of the application 
period for arbitration in three situations.  If a party is claiming a right against 
another party,109 is making a request to a department for relief,110 or if the 
opposing party consents to fulfill its obligations,111 then the arbitration 
application period for the complaining party is tolled.112  The burden is on 
the party seeking to discontinue the application period to prove that one of 
these three situations is present.113  If one of the requirements is proven, then 
the arbitration application term will “recommence” either from the date the 
opposing party refuses to perform its obligation or from the date the 
department makes its decision on whether to provide relief.114  The SPC’s 
decision to allow suspension alleviates one of the primary concerns with the 
short sixty-day statute of limitations—workers will no longer be penalized 
for pursuing alternative resolution options outside arbitration.  By clarifying 
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when disputes arise and no longer penalizing workers who seek other forms 
of redress, the Interpretation will likely lead to more arbitration. 
C. The Interpretation Recognizes Recent Attempts to Bypass Mandatory 
Arbitration by Providing for Direct Litigation in Certain Labor 
Disputes 
The increasing litigation statistics include a small number of attempts 
by workers to bypass mandatory arbitration and bring their claims directly to 
court.115  Because only courts can provide final judgment in labor disputes, 
these attempts could be responses to the challenges of enforcement 
discussed above.  The Interpretation explicitly provides for litigation without 
prior arbitration in specific circumstances. 
1. Recent Attempts to Reformulate Labor Disputes as Traditional Civil 
Claims Bring Disputes Directly to Court, Avoiding Formal Arbitration 
Most disputes between workers and employers will fall within the 
broad scope of the Labor Law.  The 2001 Interpretation defines a “labor 
dispute” as a dispute between a worker and employer under a labor contract 
or where a labor relationship exists, or a dispute involving benefits such as 
medical coverage and insurance.116  The Labor Law and Labor Regulations 
require that all labor disputes go through mandatory arbitration before 
litigation.117  Since labor disputes are so broadly defined, there is little room 
for disputes to go directly to litigation.  In fact, the Ministry of Labor 
published an opinion in 2002 that provided that an arbitration committee 
shall accept and hear a labor case, but only if it “falls into the applicable 
scope of the Labor Law and the scope of acceptable cases” in the Labor 
Regulations.118 
However, there have been some instances where workers reformulated 
their claims as civil actions.  For example, in the Shenzhen region, lawyers 
brought non-payment of wages disputes as claims for ordinary debt and 
injuries received on the job as tort claims.119  Others brought claims for 
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wrongful termination or invasion of privacy rather than pursuing 
arbitration.120  These reformulations are made possible by provisions of the 
Civil Procedure Law.  Under Article 108 of the Civil Procedure Law, a 
plaintiff must have a direct interest in the case, specify a defendant, make a 
distinct claim based on facts, have cause for the lawsuit, and bring a case 
that falls within the scope of civil lawsuits.121  Workers involved in a labor 
dispute likely have little difficulty meeting the first three requirements.  
Generally, claims are based on specific events experienced by a worker or 
group of workers.122  The challenge lies in reformulating a labor dispute to 
fall into the category of civil lawsuits, outside the purview of the Labor Law 
and the situations defined broadly in the 2001 Interpretation. 
An example of reformulation is an employer’s failure to pay wages, 
which can be considered a debt owed by the employer to the worker.  Under 
Article 189 of the Civil Procedure Law, a claim for debt may be brought if 
the parties are not involved in another “obligation dispute” and if any 
warrant for payment that is issued by the court can be served on the 
debtor.123  Additionally, the amount of money and evidence for the claim 
must be specified in the application.124  Therefore, as long as there are no 
other disputes between the worker and the employer, it is possible to 
reformulate a labor claim and to bring suit directly to court. 
2. The 2006 Interpretation Makes Civil Courts Directly Accessible for 
Certain Disputes 
The SPC allows two kinds of labor disputes to come to court as 
common civil claims.125  If a worker has evidence of a written 
acknowledgment for wages owed by an employer and has no other claims 
related to the employment relationship, then the worker can bring a claim to 
court as a common civil dispute.126  This particular provision may reflect the 
SPC’s acknowledgment that lawyers are reformulating claims. 
The second instance in which labor claims can be brought as civil 
claims based on the Interpretation relates to mediation agreements.  As 
previously mentioned, mediation agreements under the Labor Law “shall be 
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implemented by the parties,” but no language in the Labor Law makes these 
agreements legally binding or enforceable.127  In the Interpretation, the SPC 
explicitly makes agreements binding when reached before a mediation 
committee and allows the worker to bring suit as a common civil dispute if 
the employer fails to perform its obligations under that agreement.128  This 
provision offers an important enforcement mechanism, placing mediation 
agreements on the same plane as arbitral awards. 
The likely result of each of these changes under the Interpretation will 
be increased labor arbitration and litigation.  The statistics discussed in Part 
II.C illustrate that workers turn to labor dispute resolution in growing 
numbers every year.  The changes made by the 2006 Interpretation will only 
continue this impressive trend.  When the SPC introduced the 2001 
Interpretation, not all judges and arbitrators were aware of its provisions, 
limiting its initial effect on labor disputes.129  It is possible that the 2006 
Interpretation will face initial limitations as actors begin to learn of its 
provisions, but it holds promise for future arbitration and litigation. 
The increasing trend toward arbitration and litigation, however, may 
challenge the institutional capacity of arbitration panels, civil courts, and 
local attorneys who handle the volumes of disputes brought each year.  
Arbitration panels are already “overburdened” and “understaffed,”130 
patterns that would only continue with a greater influx of cases.  Courts, too, 
are already dealing with a high volume of civil and commercial litigation 
and are hesitant to accept labor disputes, which are seen as “trivial and 
tedious.”131  Chinese lawyers have an “aversion to representing workers with 
labor grievances” for a number of reasons, including the low fee potential of 
labor disputes.132  While the Interpretation extends the jurisdiction of civil 
courts, access to justice for workers may be limited by the unwillingness of 
lawyers to represent them.  These other institutional aspects of labor dispute 
resolution will also need revision to create a truly effective process, but the 
Interpretation is an important step in the right direction for workers who 
choose to rely on the Labor Law. 
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IV. THE INTERPRETATION ILLUSTRATES THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE SPC 
IN INTERPRETING LABOR LAWS 
The Chinese legal system is often described as “weak, easily 
corrupted, and subservient to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).”133  
However, as one scholar observes, “[o]ne can recognize in the working of 
[the] Chinese legal system the dual promotion of social welfare and 
individual rights that is apparent in Western legal systems.”134  The 
Interpretation provides an example of the dual considerations of social 
welfare under the policies of the CCP and individual rights provided under 
the Labor Law.  The Interpretation suggests that Chinese law does function 
in the domain of labor relations, and that the SPC plays an increasingly 
important part in that development. 
A. The SPC’s Role in Interpreting Law Is Expanding Beyond Its Official 
Bounds 
Like all governmental organs in China, the SPC has a carefully 
defined role within the structure of the state.  That role traditionally included 
a limited ability to interpret laws.135  However, the SPC’s powers to interpret 
are expanding.  Subsequent to legal developments such as the Labor Law, 
the SPC’s historical role as a judicial organ of the central government is 
evolving. 
1. The Imperfect Legal Reforms That Accompanied Promotion of the 
Socialist Market Economy Forced the Court to Expand its Interpretive 
Role 
The SPC has increasingly exercised the power of interpretation 
provided in the Interpretation Resolution.136  It has done so out of necessity.  
Legal reform in the 1980s and 1990s produced vague legislation, making it 
difficult for courts to apply promulgated laws.137  Legal reform was 
originally envisioned as gradual.  As Deng Xiaoping put it, “we should not 
wait for a ‘complete set of equipment.’  In short, it is better to have some 
laws than none, and better to have them sooner than later.”138  The result was 
colorfully described by one scholar as a “disparate mass of laws and 
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regulations [that] . . . does not possess sufficient unity to be regarded as a 
coherent body of law.”139  The entire constellation of labor law has not been 
immune to these inconsistencies, as the administrative regulations and local 
and county rules tend to conflict as much as the Labor Law.140  With its 
power to interpret laws, the SPC stepped in to fill legislative gaps.  This was 
referred to as “a creative law-making process,”141 and it appears to be a 
process that the Standing Committee is willing to allow.  The Standing 
Committee has not interfered, even where SPC interpretations directly 
conflict with a given piece of legislation.142 
It is still important to consider the SPC’s administrative role and 
continuing relationship with the CCP.  The government continues to control 
the available paths to dispute resolution through the Labor Law and Labor 
Regulations.  However, the SPC is acting to aid the efficiency of the process 
and workers’ access to that process.  The Interpretation is an example of 
court-made rules responding to ambiguities in the law to foster greater 
efficiency.  The Labor Law provides an example of legislation that did not 
keep pace with the needs of workers, arbitration panels, or courts.  
Increasing disputes emphasize the ambiguities of the Labor Law’s provisions 
concerning the application period and other aspects of dispute resolution.  
The SPC responded with legal interpretation, filling in gaps and even 
expanding court jurisdiction over specific types of labor claims. 
2. This Interpretive Role Is Not Unique to China’s Courts, and Reflects 
Similar Evolutions of Judicial Power in Other Countries 
China’s problems are not unique, as Western democracies also deal 
with controversies over the interpretive power of courts.143  For example, 
following the birth of the concept of separation of powers after the French 
Revolution, civil law countries strictly limited courts to prevent them from 
interfering in the law and policy-making sphere of the legislature.144  Those 
prohibitions did not last long.145  Eventually, both civil and common law 
countries came to accept some degree of judicial interpretation.146  For 
example, in Germany, another civil law country, there is no legislation 
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covering trade unions or the right to strike.147  The German Federal Labor 
Court and the German Federal Constitutional Court have both stepped in to 
provide case law in these open areas of labor law.148  It is not unusual, 
therefore, for courts to take on a more active role to better facilitate the law. 
B. At Least Until Legislative Changes Are Made, the SPC Will Likely 
Continue to Interpret Law to Ensure More Effective Use of the Labor 
Law 
The SPC is likely to continue balancing the competing interests of the 
socialist market economy with the need to protect workers, if only to prevent 
social instability.  The SPC chose a reasonable approach in the Interpretation 
and its effects will become apparent in the next few years. 
Beyond its substantive provisions, the Interpretation will likely affect 
the capacity of arbitration panels and courts to hear the increasing number of 
labor disputes.  The SPC is the administrator of the judicial system.149  By 
expanding the jurisdiction of civil courts to hear certain types of labor 
disputes, the Interpretation removes some of the pressure placed on already 
strained arbitration committees.  At the same time, the Interpretation’s 
overall impact will likely lead to an increasing number of disputes so that 
capacity and resources remain challenges to effective dispute resolution.  
However, legislative changes are necessary to fully respond to those 
concerns.  In the meantime, the SPC is taking an active role. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The 1994 Labor Law bestows rights that an impressive number of 
workers assert each year.  Statistics illustrate the transition of labor dispute 
resolution away from mediation within enterprises toward adjudication and 
litigation in a formal setting.  Unfortunately, workers who use labor dispute 
resolution are only a small portion of those who could assert their rights. 
The 2006 Interpretation by the SPC expands the reach of the Labor 
Law to encompass a larger variety of disputes and to give workers more 
opportunities to bring claims that would have been denied in the past.  It 
clarifies ambiguities that once drew criticism.  There is now a clear standard 
for determining when a labor dispute arises.  Courts must now accept certain 
appeals of arbitral decisions.  Workers will no longer be penalized for 
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pursuing alternative means of resolving their disputes because the 
application period for arbitration can be tolled.  Certain claims can bypass 
arbitration and no longer have to rely on reformulations under the Civil 
Procedure Law. 
There will likely be difficulties with the capacity of legal institutions 
to handle the continuing increases in arbitration and litigation that the 2006 
Interpretation will fuel.  Consideration of these challenges will become even 
more important as dispute resolution increases.  As the SPC’s interpretive 
role expands, the court can aid with those challenges.  But the ultimate 
decisions rest with the other organs of government that crafted the Labor 
Law.  The SPC can only extend the reach of the Labor Law so far.  The court 
has taken an important step and workers will benefit from it. 
As long as there are inconsistencies and gaps in the law, the court will 
continue to respond with needed changes.  The effects of the SPC 
Interpretation will not be known for a number of years, but it holds promise 
for the future of labor dispute resolution in China. 
